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The Norwegian Petroleum Regulatory Framework and the Transition 
to Green Energy 
Alexandru Gociu* 
ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to critically explore the history of the Norwegian 
petroleum regulatory framework to reveal the main legal innovations that spurred the creation of 
an original model focused on the principles of sustainability and environmental protection. I 
analyse how these principles facilitated the transition process from reliance on fossil fuels to the 
development of renewable sources of energy. After the discovery of oil, Norway, though 
inexperienced in petroleum exploration and exploitation, was able to coin a framework that kept 
control over the oil industry in the state’s hands. The “go slow” policy and the creation of the 
national company were the main instruments to maintain a strong bargaining power in relation to 
big multinational oil companies. Norway enacted 10 “oil commandments” which formed the basis 
for its oil constitutionalism. This led to the principles of sustainability and environmental 
protection being codified in article 112 of the constitution in 1992 (as former Art 110 b). I will 
show how these unique conditions aided the transition to renewable sources of energy and 
compelled the national oil company, Statoil (now Equinor ASA), to invest and innovate in the field. 
1. Introduction 
Norway is one of the largest oil producers in the world, but an unconventional one as it has 
gradually transitioned to renewable sources of energy as a source of income instead of oil. This 
process has not been without controversy as the Norwegian legal system favours environmental 
protection and sustainable use of natural resources while also supporting its petroleum industry. In 
2017 this conflict was publicised by an ice sculpture erected near the Oslo courthouse by 
environmental groups. The sculpture depicted article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution1 and 
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1 Mikael Holter, ‘Arctic Oil Drilling Under Attack As Norway Dragged To Court’, (World Oil, 13 November 2017) 
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highlighted one of the most important judicial proceedings for future oil exploration in the Arctic. 
In this proceeding, a group of NGOs challenged the Norwegian Government’s2  decision to grant 
oil exploration licenses in the Arctic. They relied on article 112 which guarantees natural resource 
sustainability and environmental protection. This was unprecedented for a nation with a reputation 
for environmental protection and sustainability. 
This reputation is best demonstrated by the Storting’s (Norwegian Parliament) response to 
the discovery of oil on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the early 1960s. As a small nation 
lacking experience in oil and gas but with considerable expertise in hydropower, Norway enacted 
a revolutionary regulatory framework. Indeed, the seeds of sustainability and subsequent transition 
to renewable energy were planted by the Storting enacting the “10 oil commandments” in 1971. 
This legislation shaped Norwegian oil policy for decades by acting as an “oil constitution” which 
guided and shaped political decisions about oil. It also emphasized the importance of national 
control over oil and gas resources as well as ensuring a strong emphasis on sustainability. 
Furthermore, the “go slow” policy played a dual role to both enforce control over oil production 
and increase the Norway’s bargaining power with big oil companies. 
Given this unique regulatory environment, this article focuses on how Norway is 
transitioning to renewable sources of energy while still retaining abundant national deposits of oil 
and gas. Indeed, this approach which centralizes the regulation of oil exploitation is not only an 
effective transition to renewable energy but has not previously been analysed in depth and is thus, 
the legal nature of this transition is focus of this article. Section 2 traces the origins of Norwegian 
Oil Policy, namely the Norwegian hydropower regulation and the development of early petroleum 
regulation in the 1960s and early 1970s. The role of the global oil crisis and protectionist policies 
on oil supply will be discussed next. Section 3 focuses on Norwegian oil constitutionalism which 
includes the “10 oil commandments” that functioned as the world’s first ‘oil constitution’, the 
creation of the national oil company, the “go slow” policy, and the principle of realist 
sustainability. It will be shown that Norwegian oil constitutionalism involves a long-term oil policy 
and a transition to domestic renewable sources of energy. Section 4 discusses the recent Supreme 
Court case of Norwegian People v Arctic case where some of the primary tenets of oil 
 
2 Oslo District Court 16-166674TVI-OTIR/06,  Borgarting Court of Appeal 18-060499ASD-BORG/03, Supreme 
Court of Norway HR-2020-846-J, (sak nr. 20-051052SIV-HRET). 
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constitutionalism came to the fore. Lastly, the article argues that the entire Norwegian legal 
framework was developed under the banner of “realist sustainability” which favoured later the 
transition to renewable energy. 
2. The origins of Norwegian oil policy  
Norway designed its petroleum regulatory framework in an was unconventional manner 
given that oil and gas was approached on different grounds by other countries in the late 1960s 
Based on its hydropower experience Norway started to build slowly a petroleum regulatory 
framework that would keep oil and gas reserves under state control. This early regulation and the 
evolution of oil and gas policy was determinant in creating the settings for a slow process of 
shifting its oil industry towards renewables despite still having large oil reserves on The 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. This process was possible because of the principle of realist 
sustainability embedded in early oil and gas regulation, way before being elevated at constitutional 
level. Thus, only analysing the evolution of the early Norwegian oil and gas policy and regulation 
framework, one can understand the philosophy behind Norway’s contemporary approach to 
sustainability, protection of the environment and shift towards renewables.   
2.1. Hydropower and early petroleum regulation  
From its early days of independence, Norway has actively invested in the least polluting, 
most sustainable, and cheapest source of energy at the time: hydroelectric power. Hydroelectric 
power plants were designed to sustain electrochemical and electrometallurgical industries which 
were heavily power intensive.3 Unfortunately, Norway had limited capital resources for building 
dams and plants.4  Thus, foreign investors, mainly from France and Germany invested in the 
necessary infrastructure.5  Unsurprisingly, the challenge to regulate and control foreign interests 
 
3 Svein Ivar Angell, ‘Den historiske bakgrunnen for heimfallsinstituttet’ (2006) 05/2006 Magma Econas Tidsskrift 
for Økonomi og Ledelse <www.magma.no/den-historiske-bakgrunnen-for-heimfallsinstituttet> accessed 27 
February 2020.     
4 Knut Kjeldstadli (1994): Et splittet samfunn, Aschehougs Norgeshistorie, Oslo: Aschehoug: 39, jf. Angell, Svein 
Ivar (2002): Den svenske modellen og det norske systemet – Tilhøvet mellom modernisering og identitetsdanning i 
Sverige og Noreg ved overgangen til det 20. hundreåret, Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget: 31 ff. cited by Svein Ivar 
Angell, ‘Den historiske bakgrunnen for heimfallsinstituttet’ (2006) 05/2006 Magma Econas Tidsskrift for Økonomi 
og Ledelse <www.magma.no/den-historiske-bakgrunnen-for-heimfallsinstituttet> accessed 27 February 2020. 
5 Paul Cleary, Trillion Dollar Baby -How Norway beat the Oil Giants and Won a Lasting Fortune (Biteback 
Publishing, 2016) 3. 
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in Norway became considerable. 6  Therefore the Storting enacted the first concession laws 
(konsesjonslovene also known as panic-laws or panikklover) in 1906 which aimed to ensure natural 
resources were Norwegian state property.7 The legislation was extended in 1909 by the adoption 
of the regulation of the use of natural resources8 and  in 1917 by an industrial concession law.9 
This legal framework ensured early on,  that the Norwegian philosophy, which links sustainability 
to tightly controlled natural resources, was enshrined in law.  
After the Second World War, Norway experienced a strong economic10 development.11 
The cheap and sustainable electricity produced by hydroelectric plants contributed decisively to 
the development of the power-intensive chemical industry. 12  However the main source of 
Norwegian national income was the shipping industry.13 In the first eighteen years after the war, 
the Labour Party were in power14 and governed according to basic principles of sustainability.15 
Long-term investments that would build a robust economy were the priority, even at the cost of 
delaying consumption.16  
Further, the Suez Crisis from 1956-1957 led oil companies to consider the North Sea as an 
attractive zone for petroleum exploration.17 At the same time, Europe enjoyed an accelerated rate 
of industrial development, thus needing more cheap oil.18 In the late 1950s, Norway’s Geological 
 
6 ibid. 
7 Angell (n 3). 
8 ibid. 
9 The Norwegian approach was ideologically based on David Ricardo’s concept economic rent and the 
reinterpretation of his ideas by Henry George. Henry George, Progress and Poverty; an Inquiry into the Cause of 
Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth: The Remedy (AMS Press New York 1973). 
10 Angus Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford 1989) 177. 
11 Helge Ryggvik, ‘A Short History of the Norwegian Oil Industry: From Protected National Champions to 
Internationally Competitive Multinationals’ (2015) Business History Review 89 3, 5 
12 ibid 6. 
13 ibid.  
14 Cleary (n 5) 6. 
15 ibid.  
16 ibid. 
17 Petter Nore ‘The Norwegian state’s relationship to the international oil companies over North Sea Oil 1965-75’ 
(PhD thesis, Thames Polytechnic 1979) 6  Shell Oil and Gas from the North Sea( Shell Briefing Service, May 1972, 
revised August 1972)  4. 
18 Oystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the Noth Sea (Croom Helm London, The 
International Research Center for Energy and Development (ICEED) Boulder, Colorado 1980) 37. 
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Survey was sceptical that there was oil in the North Sea,19 thus Norway initially avoided20 the 
ratification Convention on the Continental Shelf (hereinafter referred as ‘the Convention’) adopted 
at the United Nations’ Conference on the Law of the Sea (24 February to 27 April 1958).21  
The discovery in 1959 of the Groningen natural gas field in the Netherlands22 also shifted 
attention23 towards the North Sea.24 The first exploratory drillings from 1961 on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf indicated the presence of oil.25 A short time later, larger oil companies began to 
express interest in exploring the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Starting in the autumn of 1962 and 
until June 1963, six oil companies approached the Norwegian government with a desire to explore 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf.26  
Similarly to Norwegian hydropower regulation, Norwegian petroleum activity was 
regulated to ensure independent decision making and that the State retained tight control over all 
oil and gas related activities. Norway was already self-sufficient from an energy27 point-of-view28, 
due to hydropower which satisfied almost all of Norway’s energy needs.29 This meant that Norway 
was energy independent and contributed to its strong bargaining power with big oil companies.  
However Norway still wanted to attract investments in oil and consolidate its position in the North 
Atlantic Shelf. 
To remain competitive and an attractive option for foreign companies performing 
exploratory activity necessary for identifying Norwegian oil and gas reserves, the Norwegian 
government allowed licensing seventy-eight blocks of potential oil deposits.30 The area included 
 
19 Cleary (n 5) 12. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid 11. Norway ratified the Convention in 1971. 
22 Nore (n 17) 6. 
23 ibid.  
24 Cleary (n 5) 12. 
25 Irvin L White, Don E Kash, Michael a Charlock , Michael L Devine and R. Leon Leonard, North Sea Oil and Gas 
(University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma 1973) 3.  
26 Nore (n 17) 6. 
27 Ryggvik (n 11) 12. 
28 ibid. 
29 David B. Keto, Law And Offshore Oil Development: The North Sea Experience (Praeger Publishers 1978) 33. 
30 Cleary (n 5) 17. 
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almost 20% of the Norwegian Continental Shelf31 (48 000 square kilometres)32. In comparison to 
British oil regulation, Norway allocated only half of the area licensed by the United Kingdom.33 
This is the first sign of a prudent oil exploration approach. However, the reality was that 
Norwegians were unacquainted with the exploration and exploitation of oil, while the British 
acquired experience from various oil ventures around the world via the company British Petroleum 
(BP). Norway’s experience in the oil industry was restricted to the building and the operation of 
oil tankers.34 Furthermore Norway had no previous experience35 in offshore oil36 which meant that 
only established foreign oil companies had the experience to operate on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. 37 The foreign presence was dominant in the inexperienced Scandinavian country.38  Also 
lacking experts in oil taxation, Norway was forced to rely on Esso’s representative to help outline 
the fiscal regulations39 which offered a strong advantage to oil companies.40 However, Norway 
accepted the situation as it forecasted substantial benefits from royalties and taxes after finding 
oil.41 
Norway’s position was economically weak as it was a smaller country than the UK or the 
Netherlands.42 At the same time Norway needed as many foreign oil companies as possible to 
conduct exploratory works in order to maximize the chance of oil finding43 while desperately 
needing foreign currency.44 The initial royalty was substantially lower than what oil companies 
had predicted, 10%. This was even lower than what the United Kingdom demanded from oil 
companies.45 In the beginning, Norway could not afford a radically innovative oil policy.46 Thus 
 
31 ibid. 
32The area covered almost everything south of the 60th parallel. 
33 Keto (n 29)31. 
34 Noreng (n 18) 38. 
35 Cleary (n 5) 18. 
36 Noreng (n18) 41. 
37 ibid. 
38 Ryggvik (n 11) 8. 
39 Cleary (n 5) 18. 
40 Om Skattlegging Av Undersjøiske Petroleumsforekomster [About taxation of subsea petroleum resources], Besl. 
O. [Law] no. 129 (1964–65). 
41 Ryggvik (n 11) 7. 
42 Ryggvik (n 11) 7 Cleary (n 5) 19. 
43 Cleary (n 5) 19. 
44 ibid 18. 
45 Ryggvik (n 11) 7. 
46 Cleary (n 5) 21. 
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the Government had to carefully balance the internal political pressure to acquire experience in the 
field of exploration and exploitation of offshore oil and a good share of the profit with the need to 
attract big oil companies. 47  This balance was sought to be gradually operationalised by the 
National Petroleum Council (NPC).  
In May 1968, the NPC was established as a ‘high level advisory body’ and a ‘forerunner 
to a formal regulatory authority’ 48 with competence in anything oil related. While the Industry 
Department raised the issue of government participation to the NPC in 1968, but Norway had no 
capital for oil exploration.49  In response, the NPC drafted a licensing provision to allow state 
participation only when a commercially viable discovery was made.50 On 10 December 1968 the 
Norwegian government empowered the NPC to represent the state in negotiations with oil 
companies regarding state participation.51 Government participation in the 1969 licensing rounds 
varied between 5% and 40%.52  
However despite this, the Norwegian state still had neither expertise nor financial means 
to implement its government share.53 As foreign currency was urgently  needed to finance the 
exploration of oil, the NPC sought to limit local companies from being the primary players.54 This 
was met with some resistance as prominent business personalities and the largest Norwegian 
company, Norsk Hydro, lobbied for greater participation of local companies.55 They wanted to be 
involved in the promising new opportunity.56  Notwithstanding, foreign companies had a strong 
presence as Phillips Petroleum obtained promising blocks.57 Minority Norwegian participation 
 
47 Noreng (n 18) 41. 
48 Cleary (n 5) 30. 
49 ibid 30-31. 
50 ibid 31. 
51 ibid. 
52 Lind T, and Mackay G, Norwegian Oil Policies, (C Hurst & Coy, London1980) 102-103. 
53 Cleary (n 5) 31. 
54 Ryggvik (n 11) 7. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid. 
57 Cleary (n 5) 28. 
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was present in twenty-one blocks.58 In contrast, the first concession round of the United Kingdom59 
saw British companies present in 283 of 346 blocks.60  
Though the NPC used strategic policies that attracted finance and expertise, oil was not 
discovered in the Norwegian blocks for three years.61 In a historic moment, gas and pressurised 
oil was found on 15 September 1969.62 On 23 December 1969 Norway officially announced the 
discovery of the Ekofisk oil field.63  Due to technological and expertise limitations, the Norwegian 
contribution to Ekofisk was low, in 1975 attaining only 28%.64 The local companies were left with 
activities requiring basic skills.65 Despite strong oversight and a coherent normative framework 
for building the oil industry, the supply system for the petroleum operations was a challenge for 
the architects of the Norwegian petroleum regulatory framework. Here, the political economy of 
oil supply shows the development of a protectionist drive, and the gradual transition to a ‘Go Slow’ 
oil constitutionalism.    
 2.2. Protectionist policies and the global oil crisis  
The supply and service industry in offshore oil exploration and exploitation is essential as 
it provides the necessary materials, equipment, food for personnel and maintenance equipment for 
production. At the beginning of the oil and gas operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in 
the early 1970s,  the big American oil companies (Esso, Mobil and Amoco)66 tried to impose a 
supply system based almost exclusively on American products.67 Additionally, the oil companies 
requested unrestricted market access not only for themselves but for their supply and service 
industry.68In the UK, in order to mitigate the effects of American supply policy the “Full and Fair 
 
58 Ryggvik (n 11) 7. 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid 8. 
61 Cleary (n 5) 20. 
62 ibid 26; Cleary’s personal communication with Finn Sandberg, curator of the Norwegian Oil Museum, 25 
September 2015. 
63 Cleary (n 5) 27. 
64 Storting Petroleumsundersøkelser Nord for 62. Breddegrad [Petroleumexploration north of 62nd latitude], (White 
Paper no. 57, 1978–1979) cited also by Ryggvik (n 11) 14. 
65 Paul C. Hallwood, Transaction Cost and Trade between Multinational Corporations: A Study of Offshore Oil 
Production (Boston, 1990) 73 cited also by Ryggvik (n 10) 14. 
66 After mergers Esso and Mobil became ExxonMobil and Amoco, British Petroleum (BP). 
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Opportunity for UK Suppliers” was initiated but the oil companies succeeded to neutralize the 
project.69 However the situation was different in Norway, as there the oil companies were willing 
to generally comply with the Norwegian rules70 and specifically, the policy of procuring services 
and supplies form Norwegian companies.71  A protectionist drive first manifested itself in Norway 
when significant stakeholders in the Norwegian shipbuilding industry became interested in 
supplying the oil industry. They successfully lobbied and achieved the enactment of the 1972 
Royal decree 72  which helped the Government to force operators to increase Norwegian 
participation in the supply system. 
However, this legislation which required foreign big oil companies to buy Norwegian 
equipment could only be effective if there was a national supply and service industry.73 The 
Norwegian entrepreneurs responded quickly 74  in the field of offshore oil equipment 75  and 
challenged the American monopoly in oil rig construction, business securing, in short time, a 
market share of around 20%.76 Being a shipbuilding country, Norway also benefited from a strong 
and innovative77 financing system created for ensuring the capital to supply shipyards78 which 
dramatically improved the shift to build oil equipment.79  Thus, there was a convergence of 
interests of the shipping industry and the political move to promote Norwegian companies in 
having a hold on the supply of oil.80 However, Norwegian oil was hit hard in the wake of  the 1973 
oil crisis because of the lack of an extended industrial base, the inability to market their products 
efficiently, poor communication between small companies, and the inability to manage bids for 
 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid 33; Department of State, Cable from Oslo to Washington , 18 of July 1975 stating that: “oil companies have 
generally been anxious to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate with the Norwegian government and to 
operate as good corporate citizens in Norway”. 
71 ibid 33; Department of State, Cable from Oslo to Washington , 18 of July 1975 said that: ’Government is 
understood now to be exerting real pressure to swing as much as possible of the business, especially big items, to 
Norwegian companies’. 
72 Royal decree of 8 Dec. 1972, §54. 
73  Ryggvik (n 11) 11. 
74  ibid 12. 
75  ‘The New Vikings’ The Economist 26.07.1975 cited also by Cleary (n 4) 111. 
76 Cleary (n 5) 112. 
77 Ryggvik (n 11) 12 and Hanisch and Nerheim, Fra Vantro Til Overmot, 223 
78 ibid. 
79 Cleary (n 5)114 and Ryggvik (n 11) 12, 33.  
80 Cleary (n 5)113. 
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equipment and installations. 81  In the United Kingdom, given the economic crisis and 
unemployment from the winter of 1974 that slowed down the British economy, the Labour 
government, led by Harold Wilson, started to mirror the Norwegian protectionist approach to 
eliminate Norwegians from the British market.82 
Initially, American companies still were able to import a lot of American equipment for 
their platforms on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 83  While the rigs were constructed by 
Norwegians, these local companies lacked the advanced technologically capability for a complete 
operation of an offshore production unit.84 This meant that American companies such as Santa Fe, 
Rowan Companies, and Zapata were produced and operated85 in-house technology on Norwegian-
built drilling rigs.86  However following  the 1972 decree,  Norwegians began to innovate at an 
astonishing pace. There were two dimensions of the Norwegian approach. The first was to adapt 
existing technologies to the special conditions of the North Sea, and the second was to develop 
new technologies that would facilitate a smooth and efficient operation. 87  For example, one local 
business designed a new semi-submersible drilling rig to survive the rough conditions of the North 
Sea while also improving operability, seaworthiness, mobility, and cost efficiency. 88 
In addition to these technological advances, the Norwegian government also devised three 
regulatory innovations. Firstly, concession agreements89were approved by both the Ministry of 
Petroleum and the Storting. The latter is significant because Parliamentary members are seated by 
regions not by party affiliation meaning that successful licensing bids require oil companies to 
boost businesses in different regions of Norway. Additionally, the 1972 decree meant that 
exploratory and development licenses were subject to oil companies “generat[ing] business for 
 
81 Noreng (n 18) 56. 
82 Ryggvik (n 11) 14. 
83 Cleary (n 5) 112. 
84 ibid 14. 
85 Carl-Axel Janicke, Oljeboring Til Havs: Historien Om En Ny Norsk Næring [Offshore oil drilling: The story of a 
new Norwegian industry] (Oslo, 1984), 39  Ryggvik (n 11) 13. 
86 Ryggvik (n 11) 13. 
87 ibid. 
88 Norsk Oljemuseum Oil and Gas Fields in Norway Industrial Heritage Plan 26. 
<https://www.norskolje.museum.no/en/home/oil-facts/publications/oil-and-gas-fields-in-norway/> accessed 12 May 
2021. 
89 Under concession agreements, a  petroleum company or consortium carries out exploratory activities. The 
company gains ownership of all production, when extracted, against payment of a royalty to the host state. 
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local companies”.90 Secondly, the Government engaged in field development and indicated where 
pipelines should be installed and the requisite platform specifications.91 Third, the Norwegians 
capped state participation at 50% in promising oil fields which also boosted the Norwegian supply 
and service sector.92 
These regulatory innovations were destined mainly to serve as channels to impose 
increasingly stronger state control over petroleum activity and the creation, initially, of a strong 
Norwegian supply and service sector for the oil and gas activity on the shelf. Noticeable, as soon 
as Norway was able to increase its relevance in the oil technology field and imposed protectionist 
regulation (all this in a favourable international context) used its power to tighten furthermore the 
State’s grip on the oil and gas industry. This process continued for a while allowing Norway to 
impose its own terms, not only in protecting Norwegian immediate economic interests, but also in 
requiring that oil and gas activity is conducted in a sustainable manner, with as little damage on 
the environment as possible.  
However, in 1970 Middle Eastern oil supply caused concerns to western officials. 93 
OPEC94 members unilaterally changed the terms of existing licenses95 as it led to contracting 
parties hardening the terms of licenses such as actively seeking nationalization of their oil 
industry.96.  Moreover the Yom Kippur war determined the OAPEC97 to impose an oil embargo 
targeting countries that supported Israel. Thus, oil prices soared abruptly and in 1973-1974, an oil 
crisis emerged. 98  Given this uncertainty and the proximity 99 of the North Sea oil fields, oil 
 
90 Cleary (n 5) 33. 
91 ibid 34. 
92 ibid. 
93 Keto (n 29) 32. 
94 OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) was founded on 14 September 1960 in Baghdad by 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela being destined to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its 
members and ensure the stabilization of oil markets. 
95 Kenneth W. Dam, Oil Resources –Who Gets What How? (The University of Chicago 1976) 61. 
96 Noreng (n 18) 47. The trend was started by Libya by renegotiating its concession agreements (Keto (n 33) 32). 
97 OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) OAPEC Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Libya in Beirut signed on January 9, 1968 the agreement for the creation of OAPEC aimed at Arab cooperation in 
the field of oil. 
98 Keto (n 29) 32. 
99 Ole Andreas H. Engen names it in  ‘The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A 
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companies were determined to develop North Sea oil as soon as possible.100 Indeed, the political 
stability of the region was certainly an attraction 101  driven by seriatim economics for oil 
companies.  
These were unique conditions for the Norwegian petroleum sector to develop and, given 
the international instability and the mounting pressure from oil companies to obtain oil from a 
predictable and stable democracy, the Norwegians faced an increasing demand for oil to counter 
the OPEC created crisis. This demand implied huge pressure to increase exploration and 
exploitation activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, and to increase forex earnings. 
Therefore, the Norway needed to innovate in the oil and gas policy regulation to avoid what they 
feared the most: the foreign control over the Norwegian oil industry. The first solution was to 
develop a normative basis for oil policy by way of the “10 oil commandments”. 
2.3 Conclusion 
While genuinely surprised by its oil and gas reserves the Norwegian society coined rapidly 
an original approach to oil industry based on its previous legal frame enacted to keep hydropower 
under state control. The international context favoured the Norwegians, as oil companies searched 
for a stable and predictable country to perform petroleum related activities. Thus, the Norwegian 
regulatory framework was able to implement initial policy decisions seeking a slow and controlled 
oil and gas activity, a consistent governmental participation through a national oil company and 
the creation of a Norwegian supply and service industry.   
3.  Norwegian oil constitutionalism and the transition to renewable energy  
 As a natural evolution of the previous approach to oil and gas, four innovative policy 
decisions followed: the “10 oil commandments”, the national oil company, the “go slow” policy 
and the principle of realist sustainability. The “10 oil commandments”, essentially an oil and gas 
constitution synthetized the Norwegian approach to the petroleum industry while the creation of 
the national oil company and enactment of “go slow policy” aimed at keeping a tight state control 
 
of the project "Innovation, Path-dependency and Policy" (IPP) carried out at the Centre for Technology, Innovation 
Culture (TIK), University of Oslo 2007 <http://www.sv.uio.no/tik/InnoWP/EngenTIKpaper%20WPready.pdf>  
accessed  6 July 2020. 
100 Keto (n 29) 32. 
101 Engen, (n 99 ) 10 
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over the oil industry and at gaining a strong bargaining power in relation to big international oil 
companies. That way Norway was able to conduct oil exploration and exploitation according to its 
values and terms sustainability and protection of the environment. This setting was able to open 
the road for the introduction of art 110b (later 112) in the Norwegian Constitution, elevating the 
principle of realistic sustainability to constitutional level. In that way the tradition to protect the 
environment and exploit resources sustainably was validated and imposed constitutionally, 
encouraging the transition from oil and gas to other exportable renewable sources of energy related 
products and services.       
3.1. The 10 oil commandments  
Petroleum had become a central issue in Norwegian politics.102 The Parliament’s Standing 
Committee on Industry103 proposed a broad framework which would set the petroleum regulatory 
framework for decades. This progressive policy was likely due to the smart strategy of involving 
all members of the Storting in the process of drafting. 104 A stable, predictable, and reliable 
petroleum regulatory framework was thus created compared to other volatile jurisdictions. That 
was, and still is today, one of the main advantages of doing oil business in Norway.   
In the 1971 White Paper105 a veritable oil constitution was enacted, in the form of “10 oil 
commandments”106 containing the petroleum policy statement that would shape future Norwegian 
oil policy. The commandments stated: 107  
(1) National supervision and control must be ensured for all operations on the 
NCS.  
(2) Petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a way which makes Norway as 
independent as possible of others for its supplies of crude oil.  
 
102 No (n 18) 47. 
103Cleary (n 5) 35. 
104 ibid 36. 
105 In the Norwegian legislative system white papers (Meld.St.) are used when future policy issues are submitted to 
the Storting.  These documents do not require a specific decision but are the starting point in drafting resolutions and 
bills in a later phase.  
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(3) New industry will be developed on the basis of Petroleum.  
(4) The development of an oil industry must take necessary account of existing 
industrial activities and the protection of nature and the environment.  
(5) Flaring of exploitable gas on the NCS must not be accepted except during brief 
periods of testing. 
(6) Petroleum from the NCS must as a general rule be landed in Norway, except 
in those cases where socio-political considerations dictate a different solution.  
(7) The state must become involved at all appropriate levels and contribute to a 
coordination of Norwegian interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as to 
the creation of an integrated oil community which sets its sights both nationally 
and internationally.  
(8) A state oil company will be established that can look after the government’s 
commercial interests and pursue appropriate collaboration with domestic and 
foreign oil interests. 
(9) A pattern of activities must be selected north of the 62nd parallel which 
reflects the special socio-political conditions prevailing in that part of the country. 
(10) Large Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks for 
Norway’s foreign policy.  
Some of these commandments represented the status-quo, but some would become game-
changers for future dealings, requiring substantial changes to the petroleum regulatory framework. 
The idea of sustainability and environmental protectionism formed the basis of the fourth and fifth 
commandments.108 The idea of state control over exploration and exploitation planning and the 
creation of a Norwegian downstream petroleum industry.109 The quest for direct Norwegian state 
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participation was declared in the eighth commandment. 110  The above mentioned 
“commandments” were innovative in nature as no other petroleum producing country prioritised 
sustainability and protection of the environment at such length. 
However, tight state control over petroleum activities was imperative to make such 
principle enforceable. Thus, the Government’s bargaining power dramatically increased relative 
to oil companies because of tightly held state control, and participation in oil ventures.111This 
explains why during the interim licenses of 1971-1972 the Norwegian government was able to 
increase government participation in various oil ventures.112  
The Norwegian approach to oil and gas regulation was strongly ideological and 
sophisticated. 113  The Norwegian government and Parliament published important policy 
documents at the very beginning of the oil boom. In contrast, the British, in a pragmatic 
approach114,  avoided a policy statement similar to the “10 oil commandments”115   
3.2. The national oil company 
The third commandment of the Norwegian “oil constitution” stated the necessity of the 
creation of a Norwegian oil company:  “a new industrial sector should be developed, based on 
petroleum.”116 Many countries had already benefited from creating national companies.117  These 
companies ensured that “the greatest possible share of the economic rent ended up in the hands of 
the state”.118 A consensus was reached in the Norwegian political elite that Norway must secure 
participation in the new industry.119 The first logical step was to transform a Norwegian company, 
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112 Dam (n 97 ) 59.  
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114 ibid.  
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116 Innstilling Fra Den Forsterkede Industrikomite Om Undersøkelser Etter Og Utvinning Av Undersjøiske 
Petroleumforekomster På Den Norske Kontinentalsokkel [Recommendations from the amplified industry committee 
on exploration for and exploitation of petroleum resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf] Innst- S. 
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117 United Kingdom: The British Petroleum Company, Italy: Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi and France Essence et 
Lubrifiants de France. 
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Norsk Hydro, into the desired entity, as the company was already operating in the North Sea.120 
The Government tried to transform Norsk Hydro in a national petroleum company by buying its 
shares in secret.121While the company had considerable expertise in hydropower, it had minor 
expertise in oil and gas. It was also unsuited122 to be a national oil company because Hydro was 
difficult to control given its particular corporate culture.123 In short time it was obvious that the 
solution would not fulfil the expectations and the need for a brand-new company was born.124  
The Norwegian institutional model in the field of oil and gas regulation was reformed in 
1972125 when the Storting unanimously voted126 for a “tripartite model”. First, the Petroleum 
Ministry was created as being independent from the Industry Department. Second, the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was the new regulatory authority (independent from the Petroleum 
Ministry) overseeing all petroleum operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.127 Third, Den 
Norske Stats Oljeselskap A/S (The Norwegian State Oil Company), later renamed Statoil, was 
created.  
Statoil was created with a dual purpose: first, to pursue state interests, and second, to act 
as an operator under the supervision of NPD. 128  The two purposes were complementary as 
operatorship ensured direct technical control over oil and gas exploration, and exploitation and 
state participation through the national oil company implied financial and organizational control. 
In addition to that, there were other expectations from Statoil, such as the control of the pace of 
extractions, the standardisation of the Norwegian safety requirements for workers and the 
protection of the environment.129 In conclusion, Statoil was expected to affirm its presence in all 
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areas of the petroleum industry130 as well as to help the creation of a supply/contractor/service 
industry for the petroleum activities.131  
Statoil was wholly owned by the government but was independent from it regarding 
business decisions.132 As stated in the 10 oil commandments, Norwegians wanted to ensure that 
foreign oil investment in Norway was by exception.133 This would ensure dominant Norwegian 
presence in the Norwegian oil sector. Therefore, Statoil’s activity was vaguely and broadly 
defined, granting the company considerable leeway134 in being able to perform activities, such as 
extraction, transportation, and refining, 135  Statoil could enter into any oil venture on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf without paying for the exploration expenditures. Moreover, Statoil 
executives demanded and obtained seismic data generated by other companies which increased 
their knowledge and expertise on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.136  
The reasons for the creation of Statoil were mainly political 137 and based on the principles 
of oil constitutionalism that developed the ‘go slow’ policy, discussed in the next section. This 
paper contends the economic incentives for creating Statoil were secondary as Norway primarily 
used Statoil to increase its bargaining power and impose sustainable and environmental measures. 
Statoil, in addition to regulation and taxation legislation, tighten Norway’s control over the 
petroleum industry.138 Clearly, Statoil was not simply established to achieve short-term gains as 
without such legislative support, Statoil’s exploration and exploitation costs would be much higher 
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Statoil was formed 140 by merging Norsk Hydro and Saga Petroleum.141 While there was 
no practical difference between licensing conditions for Statoil and other companies, 142  the 
Norwegian government’s bargaining power further increased, by minimising or voiding any threat 
from an oil company to leave the Norwegian Continental Shelf,143 as Statoil was able to take over 
the operation.144 Despite identifying huge oil and gas reserves, Norway was concerned of the 
negative impact of the oil boom. While they feared unwanted economic, environmental, and social 
effects, they were also aware of the leverage they will have on big foreign oil companies. Thus, 
they conceived a revolutionary policy, the “go slow” policy.  
3.3. The “go slow” policy  
 In June 1974, the Finance Ministry’s White Paper, on The Role of Petroleum Activity in 
Norwegian Society, introduced the idea of a “go slow” policy. The main idea was the emphasis on 
moderate petroleum development145 in order to maximise Norwegian participation in petroleum 
development and production. 146  The report was mainly the result of one man’s work, Per 
Schreiner, the planning director at the Ministry of Finance.147 He understood that oil income is a 
special kind of income which could inflict strong macro-economic consequences.148 Petter Nore149 
acknowledged that “It was the first time anyone had globally made the connection between the oil 
extraction rate and macroeconomic impact in an oil-producing country”. 150  For that reason, 
petroleum must be managed in a different manner and tight state control must be put into place.151 
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use of petroleum incomes in order to avoid “inflationary pressures and changes in the patterns of 
production and settlement.”152  
Other countries gained control over their petroleum industry and resources by nationalizing 
abruptly after the oil crisis. The Norwegian approach helped achieve a similar outcome but avoided 
the international outcry accompanying nationalization  because oil companies were allowed to 
keep their ownership as long as they subjected themselves to tight Norwegian control. Moreover, 
the White Paper discussed the necessity for revising taxation policies to increase oil income for 
Norway.   
The report supported the “go slow” policy on several grounds. Firstly, it was a good 
economic solution for the inflationary pressures generated by oil revenue.153 Norway had virtually 
no unemployment. Thus, a fast-growing petroleum industry would have generated occupational 
and social issues.154 Secondly, resource management155 was important as sustainable exploitation 
of oil and gas was desired while safeguarding the environment and the Norwegian lifestyle. 
Thirdly, this policy had to be combined with a fast-learning process156 of modern petroleum 
exploration and exploitation techniques, as expertise in the field of oil and gas was desperately 
needed by Norwegian personnel. Acquiring experience would be a lengthy process, therefore 
Norway aimed at slower development establish the technical expertise required.  Ahead of its time, 
the Norwegian Government was concerned about the impact of oil on social, regional, educational, 
and environmental policies considering its ambition to create a “a qualitatively better society “.157 
The report also stated that efficient oversight of petroleum activity required firm, 
democratic institutions that could exercise control over all aspects of petroleum activity: 
exploration, rate of extraction, safety and localization.158 Specific methods were outlined for the 
successful implementation of the “go slow” policy, including the “delay in development (build-
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up) of individual finds”159 which would determine the level of state participation160 as oil prices 
went up. The paper emphasized state control in all phases of petroleum activity: “exploration, 
production, processing, exports and marketing”161. Private entities, Norwegian or foreign, could 
be hired to perform specific duties but only exceptionally to exploit oil resources.162   
In the 1969 second licensing round, only 14 blocks were released, followed in September 
1973 by only one license163 granted with Norwegian state participation of 50% by Statoil.164 In the 
third round in 1974, eight blocks were granted. 165  The Norwegian government realised the 
prospect of substantial economic benefits by taking their time in developing oil and gas assets was 
beneficial. 166 In 1979 the Norwegian government retained nine of the most, promising blocks for 
Statoil.167 
There were a few exceptions to the “go slow” policy. One of them was the Brent reservoir 
solution. Since this reservoir stretched under both countries’ sectors (British and Norwegian), the 
Norwegian government feared that their oil would be lost as the British were already extracting 
from their sector. 168  The Norwegian blocks located adjacent to Brent Field (in the United 
Kingdom Continental Shelf)169 were desired by Esso and Shell170 but assigned to Statoil. 171 Statoil 
lacked experience, and only the big oil companies had the ability for rapid exploration and 
development. Thus, the Norwegian government secured for Statoil 50% equity, Mobil 
(operator)15%, Esso 10%, Shell 10%, Conoco 10%. The remaining 5% equity was distributed 
between Saga and other private companies.172 Thus, in critical situations, Norway disregarded its 
“go slow” policy.  
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The oil policy decision embodied in the “10 oil commandments” and the original “go slow” 
approach to oil exploration and exploitation were the main precursors of a sustainability driven 
approach to oil regulatory framework. This later evolved into the principle of realist sustainability 
and eventually, the transition to renewables. 
3.4. The principle of realist sustainability 
By the spring of 1977, the “go slow” policy was so embedded in the Norwegian oil 
regulation that when the Government announced the increase of oil activities173, a new policy 
debate emerged, this time on environmental and safety grounds. 174 The Government justified the 
increase in production by the mitigation of the effects of the international recession on Norwegian 
society and the maintenance of wages and general living standards. 175 Thus, we can say that the 
“go slow” policy became part not only of the petroleum policy but also part of Norwegian society’s 
view on how to regulate the oil industry. 
The “go slow” policy and the entire Norwegian petroleum regulatory framework was a 
consequence of a tremendous amount of research and analysis with a strong emphasis on the fact 
that:  
“Norwegian oil policy is based on the principle that our petroleum resources belong to the 
nation and should be developed under full national control as an integral development of the 
nation as a whole and with due emphasis on the aspect of conservation of the non-renewable 
resources.”176  
Therefore, the white 177  paper was premised on the idea of achieving a “realist 
sustainability”. This concept evolved in time and was later added to the Norwegian constitution as 
article 110(b), later as Article 112. 178  
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In 1977, an explosion occurred on Ekofisk’s Bravo platform on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf and caused serious damage by spilling at least 120,000 barrels179 of oil180 into the North 
Sea.181 In response, the operator Phillips was put under the Norwegian State’s authority and 
responsible for the costs of cleaning up the damage.182 This explosion had profound and lasting 
effects on Norwegian oil policy.183 The Government postponed exploratory drillings until 1980 
and created an independent commission to review the explosion. 184 The independent commission 
emphasized the “poor organization and administrative systems for well control maintenance”.185 
As a result, the Norwegian government recommended improvements in the field of personnel 
training, technical inspections, control, and research in the field of safety and emergency 
situations. 186  For Norwegians, this event highlighted the enormous environmental risks the 
petroleum industry carries.  
Slowly the Government increased its control over the oil industry due to increased 
bargaining power in relation to oil companies based on the “go slow” policy, the state oil company, 
the accumulation of substantial oil resources, gradual acquisition of experience in oil and gas, and 
the evolution of the oil market. 187 Norway was able to impose its national interests. The “go slow” 
policy signalled that there was no need to develop oil resources quickly, and international oil 
companies were not able to pressure Norway into disadvantageous agreements. Moreover, in 
creating Statoil, Norway indicated that if international oil companies are unwilling to accept these 
conditions, then Statoil will take over the exploitation of oil. Given the desire of international oil 
companies to reduce its reliance on countries controlled by the OPEC, Norway, despite these 
investment constraints, was still an attractive destination.  
 
179 There were other opinions that would estimate the quantity to be 3 times more. However, the Norwegian civil 
service is proverbially honest and is not likely that it would underreport the quantity.   
180 Fischer D, ‘A decision analysis of the oil blowout at Bravo Platform’, ILASA Research Memorandum RM-78-
006, (Laxemburg January 1978) 1-2. 
181 Hans Christian Bugge, a National Perspective on the Oil-Blowout Problem in David W Fisher (ed), Managing 
Technological Accidents: Two Blowouts in the North Sea (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis- 
Pergamon Press 1982)  113. 
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183 Noreng (n18) 57. 
184 ibid. 
185 Bugge (n 181) 113. 
186 ibid. 
187 Noreng (n 18) 47. 
55 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
Norway also benefited 188  from an informed political base with a highly educated 
population who feared foreign influence and enjoyed a stable social and political system189 . 
Additionally, Norwegians were preoccupied by the protection of the environment and by the 
concept of sustainability of exploiting oil reserves.190  These factors, including pressure from 
Norwegian society, resulted in art. 110b being added to the Norwegian, ensuring sustainability and 
protection of the environment. The article states:   
“Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a 
natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural 
resources shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term 
considerations which will safeguard this right for future generations as well 
[emphasis added]. In order to safeguard their right in accordance with the 
foregoing paragraph, citizens are entitled to information on the state of the natural 
environment and on the effects of any encroachment on nature that is planned or 
carried out. The authorities of the state shall take measures for the implementation 
of these principles.”191  
For a small oil producing nation, these provisions were innovative due to the constitutional 
endorsement of realist sustainability. The provision was amended and renumbered in 2014 as art. 
112 by introducing a duty on the Government to ensure implementation of the principles enshrined 
in the article: “The authorities of the state shall take measures for the implementation of these 
principles”.192 
As the protection of the environment became a mainstream topic worldwide, the 
Norwegian energy sector started to focus on renewable sources of energy as an alternative to oil. 
This was possible because the state oil company was under strict control by the Norwegian state. 
Norway used its resources to pursue a transition to renewable sources of energy. The success of 
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Statoil was determined by the Norwegian regulatory framework and law, which promoted ideals 
that the company pursued. 193  
Due to its extensive technological experience in oil and gas, Norway was able to innovate 
in the field of renewable energy. As an example, the state oil company designed and built the world 
first floating wind farm concept (Hywind) to capture wind energy in waters deeper than 20–50 
meters.194 The concept was first built by the Norwegian national oil company at industrial scale 
near the coast of Scotland. At the same time the company became a world leader in carbon capture 
and storage (CCS).195 The process means that carbon dioxide from onshore industries is captured, 
and then permanently stored at 1000 – 2000 metres below the seabed.196  
To reflect the new approach to realist sustainability, Statoil changed its name to Equinor in 
2018. The name combines “equi” the idea of “equal, equality and equilibrium” while “nor” is 
stating the Norwegian origin. Equinor is set to invest 15-20% of its total capital expenditures in 
innovative energy solutions by 2030.197  
However, investments in renewables sources of energy are costly. The most successful oil 
fund ever created is the Norwegian Pension Fund Global which will invest only according to strict 
ethical rules, including the protection of the environment. The Storting encouraged the fund to be 
invested in unlisted renewable energy infrastructure increasing the cap from 60 billion kroner to 
120 billion kroner, which is the maximum percentage permitted by the law.198  
The Norwegian renewable energy regulatory framework adapts principles from the oil and 
gas regulation. For example, strict state control and ownership is embedded in the Offshore 
Renewable Energy Production Act of 4 June 2010. 199  This Act regulates the production, 
 
193 Dudgeon Offshore Wind Farm <https://dudgeonoffshorewind.co.uk/> accessed 12 May 2021. The state oil 
company developed four wind energy projects off the coast of the UK and Germany. It operates the Dudgeon wind 
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transformation and transmission of energy produced from renewable sources under the principle 
of public administration and control of the management.200 The act states that the identification of 
an offshore area for renewable energy production is conditioned by compliance with the 
Environmental Impact Assessment for offshore wind published in January 2013.201   
In addition, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 2003, based on Directive 2001/77/EC, 
created a system where guarantees of origin are issued for the energy produced, explaining the 
origin of the energy produced. 202 Regulation No 1652 from 14 December 2007 encompasses 
further rules regarding the issuance of guarantees of origin. This regulation enables a strict 
accountability of energy sources, the buyer being informed of the origin of the energy being 
purchased.  
The Electricity Certificate Act203, enacted on 24 June 2011 supplemented by Regulation 
Relating to Electricity Certificates from 16 December 2011 established a joint Swedish and 
Norwegian electricity certificate market from 1 January 2012 to 2035 to guarantee the production 
of 26.4 Twh electricity based on renewables sources.204 The Electricity Certificate Act was enacted 
to encourage the use of renewable sources to produce electricity. By issuing an electricity 
certificate the State guarantees that the electricity to be sold originates in renewable sources.205 
Following a parliamentary report on energy efficiency, 206 the Energy Act in 2001 was 
updated with the creation of an Energy Fund financed partly by end-users and partly by proceeds 
from a Fund for Climate, Renewable Energy and Energy Conversion. The Energy Fund is managed 
by a state owned-company, Enova. 207 The aim is to encourage a more environmentally responsible 
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energy consumption and production in addition to sustaining innovation in the field of sustainable 
energy technologies.208  
The above mentioned sustainable environmental measures are a proof a working symbiosis 
between the process of sustainable exploitation of oil reserves and using the oil income and the oil 
regulatory framework model to generate a strong sustainable energy production know-how and 
infrastructure along with regional agreements to implement them. 
3.5 Conclusion   
By enacting the “10 oil commandments” Norway structured its philosophy on controlling 
the oil and gas industry and implemented its principles regarding sustainability and protection of 
the environment while maximising income. Both the national oil company and the “go slow” 
policy were necessary to ensure that the commandments were applicable in oil and gas regulation. 
This way it was possible to impose the principle of realist sustainability on the oil industry from 
the early petroleum regulation phase until it was codified in the constitution. The petroleum 
regulatory framework evolved around this principle paving the road for the slow process of shifting 
from oil to renewables. Norway is making huge progress in the field of renewables and protection 
of the environment, not being matched by any other oil producing nation, but the process is slow 
and full of controversies.  
4.  Realist sustainability and its discontents: People vs. Arctic 
Despite being a cohesive society and with a relatively strong political consensus favouring 
Arctic oil exploration, Norwegians question the destruction of previously untouched natural 
environment.209 Thus, on 18 October 2016, Nature and Youth and Greenpeace (the main plaintiffs) 
and Friend of the Earth Norway and The Grandparents Climate Campaign (as co-plaintiffs) sued 
the Norwegian government on extending oil exploration in the Barents Sea. The case was triggered 
by two events from June 2016: the ratification of the Paris agreement and the award of the first 
licenses in the Arctic.  
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The legal action is based on article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution.210 The plaintiffs 
argue that the Government has an active duty to safeguard the environment but failed to abide by 
the duty to safeguard the environment by allowing oil drilling in the Arctic. In 2018, the Oslo 
District Court held that article 112 of the Constitution is a provision conferring rights.211 However 
the court ruled against the plaintiffs because “[e]missions of CO2 abroad from oil and gas exported 
from Norway are irrelevant when assessing whether the Decision entails a violation of Article 
112.”212 Moreover, the court found the supervision procedure regarding compliance with the Paris 
Agreement provisions satisfactory for fulfilling the constitutional duty of the Government “to take 
measures” for the preservation of the environment.  
In 2020, the Borgarting Court of Appeal affirmed the District Court's decision ruling213 
with one notable exception. The appeal judgment affirmed that art. 112 of the Constitution is 
applicable even for the emissions from the combustion of oil and gas after export. This finding is 
a very original approach to the legal issues discussed in the case and holds important consequences 
as Norway is the seventh largest exporter of oil- and gas-related emissions214 in the world. While 
Norway has extremely low levels of internal emissions by encouraging electrical cars and by 
producing electricity mainly by hydropower plants, Norway’s emissions from the exported oil and 
gas is 10 times greater than Norway’s internal emissions.215  
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Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that the Government has a high degree of discretion 
when fulfilling its art. 112 obligations. Thus, the plaintiffs were not able to prove any violation 
under the article. The Borgarting Court of Appeal decision was appealed, and on 20 April 2020, 
the Supreme Court of Norway granted leave to appeal.216  
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs emphasized three main arguments to support 
their contention that the licenses granted in the Barents Sea are invalid.217 The first is based on art. 
112 of the Norwegian Constitution, stating that the Government should act to safeguard the right 
to a clean and healthy environment. Moreover, the exploited Arctic oil will generate more 
emissions which would undermine the Paris Agreement provisions. 218  The plaintiffs were 
encouraged by the fact that both the District Court and Appeal Court interpreted the constitutional 
provisions as granting rights but were discontent with the “large margin of discretion” granted to 
the Norwegian State. Here lays the most notable difficulty for the plaintiffs, namely, to connect 
the idea of licensing and oil drilling in the Arctic with the right enshrined in art. 112.  
The second argument was based on European Convention of Human Rights and stated that 
the granted licenses will limit basic human rights (the right to life, to right to private and family 
life).219 While the European Court of Human Rights has never itself linked climate issues with 
human rights, there is national jurisprudence that does. The plaintiffs relied extensively on the 
Urgenda220 case from the Netherlands. In this case, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld a decision 
from a Hague Court requiring the Government to reduce emissions based on the Government’s 
duties to protect basic human rights. The human rights argument is especially relevant to the Sami 
people221 who presumably will suffer disproportionally compared to other groups in Norway. The 
third main argument was based on the claim that the Government grossly overestimated the 
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220 Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689. 
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potential profit from the Barents Sea oil, thus committing procedural errors in granting the 
licenses.222  
This case demonstrates a conflict at the constitutional level between climate goals and the 
sustainable development of oil and gas. It could be helpful to recall the concept of ‘realist 
sustainability’ used by Norway to shape its petroleum policy. Art. 112 is the embodiment of the 
Norwegian approach aiming at balancing the sustainable process of exploration and exploitation 
of oil with the effort to safeguard the environment. Thus, this paper argues that “realist 
sustainability” is taking shape from the constitutional text. According to this principle the 
protection of the environment and the sustainable exploitation of natural resources function as the 
two sides. 
The concept has worked for years in Norway and implies three main characteristics. Firstly, 
exploitation of natural resources (in this case oil and gas) occurs in a sustainable manner with an 
aim to shift to renewables. The second is that the protection of the environment is very important 
and many decisions regarding oil and gas are subject their environmental impact. The third is not 
explicitly stated but is a consequence of the previous two characteristics: continued exploration 
and exploitation of oil and gas is required to finance the transition to renewable sources of energy. 
This is because public support for renewables will only last if there is a strong welfare system. 
 In late 2020, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled against the appellants and stated 
that art. 112 of the Norwegian Constitution is only applicable in Norway. Thus, art. 112 is only 
applicable exceptionally to emissions generated by burning Norwegian oil in foreign 
jurisdictions.223 The Court also noted that art. 112 does not grant individual rights to challenge 
petroleum policy in court. While the judgment is complex, it confirms the Norwegian commitment 
to the principle of realist sustainability. The concepts of sustainability and protection of the 
environment are considered by the Court the foundation of the Norwegian oil policy. Further, the 
judgement explains that safety mechanisms designed to assess the environmental impact of oil 
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exploration and exploitation are sufficient to fulfil the Government’s duty to care for the 
environment.224  
5. Conclusion 
A coherent legal ideology focused on sustainability provided the foundation for the 
Norwegian petroleum regulatory framework, and the later enactment of art. 112 (former Article 
110b) of the Norwegian Constitution in 1992.  From the beginning, the Norwegian concept was 
focused on imposing the principle of sustainability on petroleum operations in the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. Realising that big oil companies would prioritise short-term interests over 
sustainability, Norway imposed strong state control. However, they also needed to increase their 
bargaining power in relation to the oil companies operating on the continental shelf. Thus, enacted 
the “go slow” policy, and created the national oil company, Statoil. The “go slow” policy conveyed 
to the big international oil companies that Norway does not necessarily need an oil boom and also 
that Norway is fighting the resource curse by avoining to become excessively dependent on oil. 
Moreover the increased bargaining power enabled by this policy granted the Norwegian 
negotiators the ability to oppose any unwanted terms proposed by international oil companies, 
being enough to mention that Statoil can take over the operations, which eventually happened to 
some extent.   
When evaluating the Norwegian model, it is important to consider the context of the 1970s 
as the oil and gas market appears very different from the 1970s. Norway was the first state to be 
deeply invest in the idea of sustainability among all the oil nations. Their motivation was complex 
as they feared excessively long periods of economic growth and high levels of inflation, and also 
aimed to avoid negative social impacts. A long-term approach instead ensured a steady stream of 
income that greatly assisted with the growth of the welfare state.  
 The Norwegian solution was very original and very difficult to be emulated for several 
reasons: Firstly, Norway from the beginning enacted an oil constitution in order have a standard 
reference for all subsequent petroleum regulations. One should note that the principles found in 
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nation that has entrenched the idea of sustainability into the development of its oil industry from 
the commencement of oil exploration and exploitation, other than at a rhetorical level. The second 
argument would be that oil is an industry full of temptations related to short-term growth; when 
oil is found, sustainability falls behind. The Norwegians were ready to slow their oil production to 
achieve their objectives. In comparison, there are few countries other where there is sufficiently 
strong political will to do the same. Thirdly, integral to the Norwegian model is a strong dedicated 
and efficient civil service which collaborated with the executive (ministers) exceptionally to 
develop a strong Norwegian petroleum industry and maintain a strict control over oil reserves in 
the Norwegian continental shelf. 
